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GENERAL
A lengthy discourse on the explosion in medical malpractice liti-
gation over the past two decades would be an unnecessary ingemination.
A few facts will suffice. One out of every four physicians practicing
medicine today can expect to be sued.' Some states, such as New York,
show a ninety percent increase in the number of malpractice suits since
1968.2 Nor has the increase in malpractice litigation been restricted
solely to the sheer number of cases. The size of the verdicts and
settlements has also mushroomed dramatically. Twenty years ago a
$100,000 verdict in a malpractice case was practically unheard of."
In the last two years, by comparison, there have been at least one medi-
cal malpractice verdict in excess of $4,000,0004 and a number of mil-
lion dollar settlements.' It is not surprising, then, that in addition to an
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law; B.A. 1965,
Pennsylvania State University; J.D. 1970, University of Pennsylvania. This reviewer is
presently engaged in the preparation of a text on the law of medical malpractice ad-
dressed primarily to law students.
1. See TIME, July 15, 1974, at 78. See generally Magnitude and Impact of the
Medical Malpractice Problem, in U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 5-
20 (1973); Rudor, Muers & Mirabella, Medical Malpractice Insurance Claims Files
Closed in 1970, in U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, APPENDIX, REPORT Or
THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 1-25 (1973).
HEREAFTER THE FOLLOWING CITATION WILL BE USED IN THIS RE-
VIEW:
D. HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1973) [hereinafter cited as HARNEY].
2. See TuE, supra note 1.
3. See Stetler, History of Reported Medical Professional Liability Cases, 30 TEm-
PLE L.Q. 367, 381 (1957).
4. See Niles v. City of San Rafael, No. 624,337 (San Francisco County Super.
Ct., Feb. 5, 1973), noted in 16 AM. TRIAL LAWYERS ASS'N NEWSLETrER 65 (1973).
In Niles a jury verdict was rendered against multiple defendants for alleged medical mal-
practice in connection with emergency room care. The total award was $4,025,000 to
compensate for quadriplegic injuries to an eleven year old boy.
5. For instance, a recent malpractice case in which the fourteen year old patient
reportedly suffered quadrispactity and blindness was settled for $2,001,000. See
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acute public awareness of the malpractice potential inherent in the
physician-patient relationship, we find a profound concern with medical
malpractice among many sectors of the legal and medical communities.
For the torts scholars and teachers, the dynamic developments in mal-
practice have infused the quiescent and sometimes stultified subject of
tort law with perhaps its most excitement since the late Dean Prosser
and others chronicled the fall of the fault- and privity-based citadel in
products liability.6 The practicing attorney, faced with the uncertainties
of an unrelenting march toward no-fault, clearly greets medical mal-
practice as a liability-producing surrogate for the automobile accident
case.7 And numerous members of the medical profession, with their
hard-won careers, prosperity, and repose threatened, entertain an almost
obsessive presentiment over the increase in their malpractice exposure.
The interest of these groups is reflected in the wide variety of re-
cent literature on medical malpractice.8 Most treatises purport to ad-
dress not only the practicing attorney, but also the legal scholar and
physician. Consequently, many books, with varying degrees of suc-
cess, have included sections embracing substantive law, practical
guidance for trial counsel, and frequent reference to the medical oc-
currences most commonly implicated in medical malpractice. Never-
theless, most books appear to at least incline toward a particular group's
perspective. The author of Medical Malpractice, Mr. David Harney,
is a prominent plaintiffs' trial attorney. Therefore, one might expect
to find the practical side of the subject stressed. However, in many
respects Mr. Harney has striven to present an amalgam combining the
significant features of books prepared by or primarily for the legal
Weaver v. Tucson Medical Center, No. 133796 (Pima County, Arizona Super. Ct., Dec.
31, 1973), noted in 17 AM. TRIAL LAWYERS Ass'N NEWSLETIER 103 (1974).
6. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. Rnv. 791 (1966). See
generally D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPPS, PRODUCTS LIA1ILITY IN A NUTSHELL (1974); W.
PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 641-82 (4th ed. 1971), and authorities cited therein.
7. Some, especially physicians and the liability insurance industry, might less char-
itably characterize the plaintiffs' medical malpractice case as simply another form of am-
bulance chasing with less indirection.
8. The reviewer's references to malpractice treatises have been limited to books
published during the last twenty years, with emphasis on the more current volumes. This
contemporary perspective reflects the fact that, both in terms of sheer numbers of appel-
late opinions as well as in their relative importance, the developments since the mid-
fifties have rendered much of the prior literature dated, if not useless, as secondary
authority. One need only recall that broad acceptance of the doctrine of informed con-
sent is commonly regarded as commencing in 1960 with the case of Natanson v. Kline,
186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, modified, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960). Other
developments, such as the eclipse of the locality rule for standard of care and adoption
of the discovery rule for statute of limitations purposes, are of even more recent vintage.
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practitioner,9 those of a more scholarly approach or useful as a research
tool,10 and treatises with a medical orientation as well.1" Mr. Harney
has succeeded rather well in dealing with those three aspects of medical
9. One of the best practical guides for practicing attorneys is L. CHARFOOS, THE
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE: A COMPLETE HANDBOOK (1974), though it contains little
substantive law and is addressed mostly to plaintiffs. Another excellent volume is C.
KRAMER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1972). See generally C. CusuMANo, MALPRACTICE
LAW DISSECTED FOR QUICK GRASPING (1962); R. GOODMAN & L. GOLDSMITH, MODERN
HOSPITAL LIABLrry-LAw AND TACTICS (1972); M. KiMMEL, LEGAL REMEDIES FOR
MEDICAL ERRORS (2d ed. 1970); M. LEVINE, SURGICAL MALPRACTICE (1970) (presented
in dialogue form with the author discussing various surgical malpractice possibilities with
physicians); D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, THE PARENCHYMA OF LAW (1960); R. MOR-
ms & A. MoRrrz, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW (5th ed. 1971) (a successor,
in part, to the treatise of the same title originally written by Dr. Louis Regan); R. MOR-
Rs & A. MoRrrz, HANDBOOK OF LEGAL MEDICINE (3d ed. 1970) (a successor, in part,
to the treatise of the same title originally written by Dr. Louis Regan and Dr. Alan
Moritz); L. REGAN, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW (3d ed. 1956); L. REGAN & A.
MoRIrz, HANDBOOK OF LEGAL MEDICINE (1956); J. RICHARDSON, DOCTORS, LAWYERS
AND THE COURTS (1965).
10. The two most encyclopedic treatises are HEALTH LAW CENTER, HOSPITAL LAW
MANUAL (ATTORNEY'S SET) (G. Stroud ed. 1974) (2 volumes published by Aspen Sys-
tems Corporation, updated quarterly with a newsletter and supplement, dealing with hos-
pital law and liability generally) and D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRAC-
TICE (1973) (2 volumes updated with an annual supplement). See generally W. MERE-
DITH, MALPRACTICE LIABILITY OF DOCTORs AND HOSPITALS (1956) (concentrating on
Canadian law); R. SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW (1973). There are also a few case-
books which deal with the law and medicine generally. See W. CuRAN & E. SHAPIRO,
LAW, MEDICINE AND FORENSIC SCIENCE (1970); D. SHARPE & M. HEAD, PROBLEMS IN
FORENSIC MEDICINE (1966). Occasionally one also discovers a law review article that
is so comprehensive in its treatment of medical malpractice that it deserves to be men-
tioned with some of the leading treatises. For example, the best, though in parts now
somewhat dated, article on the standard of care of physicians is McCoid, The Care Re-
quired of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REv. 549 (1959).
11. Members of the medical profession have produced quite a few volumes on the
subject of medical malpractice. One of the best in terms of both law and especially
medicine is B. FICARRA, SURGICAL AND ALLIED MALPRACTICE (1968). Other general
treatises with a medical orientation include R. LONG, THE PHYSICIAN AND THE LANw (3d
ed. 1968), L. REGAN & A. Moirrz, supra note 9, E. SAGALL & B. REED, THE LAW AND
CLINICAL MEDICINE (1970), B. SHARTEL & M. PLANT, THE LAW OF MEDICAL PRACTICE
(1959) (written by law professors primarily for members of the medical profession),
S. SIINDELL, THE LAW IN MEDICAL PRACTICE (1966), L. SIEGAL, FORENSIC MEDICINE
(1963), and J. WALTZ & F. INBAU, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE (1971) (though recognized
as primarily for medical students and physicians, its quality warrants broader appeal).
There are also a number of books which address, inter alla, the medical malpractice
problems of particular medical specialties or allied health professions. See, e.g., S. DON-
ALDSON, THE ROENTGENOLOGIST IN COURT (2d ed. 1954); HEALTH LAW CENTER, PROB-
LEMS IN HOSPITAL LAW (2d ed. 1974) (prepared primarily for hospital administrators);
W. HowARD & A. PARKS, CARNAHAN'S THE DENTIST AND =H LAW (2d ed. 1965); H.
SARNER, DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE (1963); H. SARNER, THE NURSE AND THE LAW (1968);
R. SLOVENKO, supra note 10; C. WASMUTH, ANESTHESIA AND THE LAw (1961); S.




malpractice when his undertaking as a whole is compared with those
of others who have attempted similarly comprehensive tasks. On the
other hand, the three components, when examined separately, produce
a somewhat more mixed response, as one might guess, in the world of
books where indeed the whole is usually greater than the sum of its
parts.
EVALUATION OF Medical Malpractice
The Author's Restatement of the Law
The first eight chapters (encompassing 270 pages, or about half
of the book) cover the decisional and statutory law of malpractice. The
text is well researched and amply documented with concise, but not
overly laconic, footnotes. The author touches the major bases, be-
ginning traditionally with the physician-patient relationship and mov-
ing on to the consent cases, standard of care, causation, evidentiary
matters including the expert witness requirements, vicarious liability,
and the various malpractice defenses, appropriately emphasizing the
statute of limitations, which is often a defendant's most successful means
of defending a malpractice suit. The main utility of the substan-
tive law portion of this book lies in its presentation of the black letter
law and in its value as a good case-finding tool. The book lacks some
of the perspicuousness found in parts of the works by other practition-
ers, such as Kramer's Medical Malpractice.12  Yet this is more than
offset by the thoroughness and, with one exception,13 by the national
scope of Mr. Harney's documentation. 4 By the same token, Mr. Har-
ney falls short of the comprehensiveness of the encyclopedic two-volume
Louisell and Williams set'5 and of Hospital Law Manual'6 published
by Aspen. Yet, here again, there are countervailing advantages in
12. C. KRAMER, supra note 9.
13. Mr. Harney does not generally accord undue emphasis to the substantive law
of any particular jurisdiction. One notable exception is the section on res ipsa loquitur,
HARNEY § 4.3(A), which is essentially a restatement of the law of California. With
classic cases like Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944), California
has led the way in the development of res ipsa in medical malpractice. However, a re-
view, with illustrative cases, of the protean rules of res ipsa and circumstantial evidence
in other jurisdictions would have been more in keeping with a book that purports to be
national in its scope, notwithstanding the author's practical background in California
law.
14. While Mr. Kramer's book contains an adequate statement of the law of malprac-
tice generally, it relies upon an inordinate number of New York decisions which limits
the appeal and to some extent the utility of his fine book.
15. D. LOUJSELL & H. WiLmAMS, supra note 10.
16. HEALTh LAW CENTER, supra note 10. This reference work is addressed almost
exclusively to problems of hospital law and liability.
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the Harney book. Published recently, it displays good coherence in
its treatment of the substantive law. The reader of the Louisell and
Williams set will find, by contrast, increasing difficulty in bridging
the gap between the basic text and the current supplement. Thus, the
analytical superiority that the Louisell and Williams set once would
have had over a much more black-letter-law-oriented book like Harney's
has been seriously eroded. Furthermore, Louisell and Williams are at
times sluggish and uncertain, which is certainly not the case with Mr.
Harney. His simplicity of style and sense of significance evidences the
value a trial lawyer's perspective can bring to the substantive law where
the author is willing to invest the time.
Aside from its unembarrassed proffer of black letter law and
its excellent case selection, the book does have limitations. It lacks
persuasive force in its treatment of some difficult issues, aside from
the usual imprimatur a text confers simply because it appears to be
a well-documented book. Therefore, as a secondary source that must
rely upon its persuasive force, the Harney book does not reach the
level of some of the classic hornbook treatises in the Prosser tradition.17
Basically, the problem seems to be one of too little analysis, and there
is possibly some question as to objectivity. By way of caveat, the
success of Mr. Harney's attempts "to be objective and two-sided in
writing this book,"' 8 is not entirely free from doubt. His resolutions
of conflicts in the law on matters in a state of flux appear to favor the
plaintiff-patient with predictable regularity. Thus, the author adopted
the reasonable man standard rather than the reasonable physician stand-
ard to evaluate the adequacy of the doctor's disclosures of the
risks of treatment; 19 he rejected the customary practice rule; 20
he urged the abandonment of the locality rules;2' he urgued
strenuously for broad application of res ipsa loquitur;22 he favored re-
quiring less testimonial certainty to establish medical causation; 23 and
he advocated the discovery doctrine for statute of limitations pur-
poses. 24 It is true that until quite recently, the courts applied a
number of doctrines which served to insulate the medical profession,
to varying degrees, from malpractice liability. There are a number
17. W. PROSSER, supra note 6.
18. HARNEY iii.
19. See id. § 2.4(A).
20. See id. § 3.1(B).
21. See id. § 3.3.
22. See id. § 4.3(A), at 173.
23. See id. § 4.1, at 167-72.
24. See id. § 8.5, at 267-70.
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of possible explanations for this tendency. The practice of medicine, as
possibly no other, provides an indispensable service to the public.
Furthermore, a physician-patient relationship is unique in that the
association of the parties usually commences after the potential plaintiff
has already been afflicted with an infirmity. Thus in the medical mal-
practice context, unlike most personal injury actions, the interface
separating the physical condition of the plaintiff before and after the
alleged tort is frequently obscured. This situation, coupled with the
esoteric nature of medical science, presents obvious temptations to a
jury to forsake its traditional role and go for the deep pocket. The
validity, if any, of these observations and other factors underlying the
development and subsequent partial abandonment of some of the pur-
portedly physician-oriented rules of medical malpractice law might
profitably have been explored by Mr. Harney.
To be sure, the author may have the support of some commentators
and at least a respectable number of courts for many of his conclusions.
Nevertheless, a more analytical and less conclusory approach would
have been welcomed, especially in view of the plaintiff bias evident in
the author's background.25 For example, Mr. Harney allocates less
than two pages to the complex issue of whether conformity to the cus-
tomary practice should conclusively establish due care on the part of
doctors. He rejects one prevailing view that it does, arguing summarily
that the usual or customary practice may nevertheless be negligent.",
Certainly this is true, and if that were the only consideration, there
could be no controversy. However, there are at present perhaps a
majority of courts which equate, in most instances, customary prac-
tice with good medical practice.2 7  In such a setting, the author's con-
25. Mr. Harney's book has received at least the qualified endorsement of the De-
fense Law Journal, which recognizes that it is "plaintiff oriented" but nevertheless "com-
prehensive and well-documented." 23 DEFENSE L.J. (back cover, No. 4) (1974). It
should perhaps be noted parenthetically that the Allen Smith Company is publisher of
both the Harney volume and Defense Law Journal.
The comments in the accompanying text are not meant to imply that Mr. Harney's
writing lacks clarity or vigor, which it certainly does not. In fact, in parts his shorthand
style of describing a rule of law proves quite refreshing. For example, he describes the
typical causation argument of defendant as the "so what" gambit-that is, so what if
my client was negligent, the patient would have died, suffered disability or infection,
etc., when he did in any event. HARNEY § 4.1, at 165.
26. See HARNEY § 3.1(B), at 90.
27. See, e.g., 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLi S, supra note 10, I 8.04; W. PROSSER,
supra note 6, § 32, at 165; McCoid, supra note 10, at 609; Morris, Custom and Negli-
gence, 42 CoLuM. L. REv. 1147, 1163-67 (1942), and cases cited therein. For per-
suasive argument against the customary practice rule (which is useful to compare with
the quality of the Harney analysis), see Note, An Evaluation of Changes in the Medical
Standard of Care, 23 VAND. L. Rv. 729, 741-47 (1970).
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clusions would have been more credible and more plausible had he
relied not only upon a few isolated malpractice cases but also upon
the fact that the rule in negligence law generally lends support to his
argument. There, compliance with the customary practice is usually
merely evidence of due care; it is seldom conclusive.28 What's more,
in the name of evenhandedness, the author perhaps should have con-
fronted and disposed of the arguments most often urged in support of
the special treatment accorded physicians under the customary prac-
tice rule, namely, that the physician's professional education is often
the emanation of customary practice, and therefore the doctor has a
genuine reliance interest in the law's deference to the usual practice;
and that absent the customary practice rule, how are juries to decide
with any predictability issues of due care involving matters of pro-
fessional judgment? One might also inquire what the effect of the
Professional Standards Review Organization (PSRO) Amendments 2
to the Social Security Act8" will be. This legislation includes a provision
for civil immunity from suit by Medicare, Medicaid, and Maternal and
Child Health Care patients where the attending physicians have com-
plied, under somewhat vague circumstances,3 1 with certain profession-
ally-developed norms of care applied by a professional standard review
organization.32 In short, it would have behooved Mr. Harney to have at
least fleshed out his arguments (which may, incidentally, ultimately hold
sway) with more searching analysis.
In a few instances the recommendations of the author are not
merely conclusory, but even precipitous. For example, in his dis-
cussion in Chapter 1 of the scope of a private hospital's duty to accept
patients, Mr. Harney advocates the imposition of a duty to treat any
individual requesting emergency care even where the patient had not
28. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 33.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c (Supp. II, 1972).
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1396(i) (1970).
31. The grant of immunity is clouded somewhat by the ambiguously worded qualifi-
cation that the doctor must first have "exercised due care in all professional conduct
taken or directed by him and reasonably related to, and resulting from, the actions taken
in compliance with or reliance upon such professionally accepted norms of care and
treatment." 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-16(c) (Supp. II, 1972). Depending on the construction
the courts ultimately give to this language, it may simply create a presumption that the
complying physician exercised due care in relying upon the prescribed standards, or it
may actually immunize him from liability to the extent that the selection or ad-
ministration of the treatment was in reliance upon the prescribed norms. See Note,
Federally Imposed Self-Regulation of Medical Practice: A Critique of the Profes-
sional Standards Review Organization, 42 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 822, 838-42 (1974). See
generally Comment, PSRO: Malpractice Liability and the Impact of the Civil Immunity
Clause, 62 GEo. LJ. 1499 (1974).
32. See authorities cited in notes 29 & 31 supra.
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relied on a past custom of the hospital to do so." Presumably, this
duty would apply even in the absence of special statutory provisions for
reimbursement for the hospital's services to insolvent patients. Where
such pervasive precepts in the law are espoused, one might have ex-
pected the author to weigh more of the implications. What of the
surely enormous costs; who will pay? Do we really want medical
personnel exercising their professional judgment against their will? Do
we similarly prescribe an affirmative duty for all members of society
to render emergency aid to those requesting it? Would the fact that
emergency treatment was available without regard to ability to pay
encourage the public to postpone preventive medical care until an
emergency arises?
In another subsection of the book, Mr. Haney adopts a disquiet-
ingly one-dimensional attitude toward the practice of defensive medi-
cine.34  He concentrates on the possibility that the in terrorem ef-
fect of threatened liability might on occasion produce a greater measure
of care by the profession, 5 whereas he fails completely to acknowledge
the inflated costs36 and potentially adverse medical results37 of con-
ducting more tests and medical procedures than are medically war-
ranted.
There have been recent calls for a restatement of medico-legal
principles that might be more universally acceptable throughout the
33. HARNEY § 1.1(B), at4.
34. The relation of malpractice suits to the practice of defensive medicine is dis-
cussed in The Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of Defensive Medicine, 1971 DUKE
L.J. 939.
35. See HARNEY § 3.1(D), at 92, quoting Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 451, 173
A.2d 277, 286 (1961).
36. The Secretary's Commission on Medical Malpractice has recently described the
inflationary effect of defensive medicine in the following terms:
One of the most pervasive impacts of the medical malpractice problem
arises out of what is commonly called "defensive medicine"....
Overutilization of health care facilities, particularly unnecessary hospital
stays, is often cited as an especially abusive practice of defensive medicine,
one that could have a tremendous impact on the nation's health bills. U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, MEDICAL MALPRACrICE, supra note
1, at 14-15 (emphasis added).
It should be noted that the recent PSRO Amendments to the Social Security Act were
designed to reduce unnecessary medical utilization by providing a limited civil immunity
which, it was hoped, would obviate the need for defensive medicine. See authorities
cited in notes 29 & 31 supra.
37. The physiological dangers to the patient of defensive medicine are self-evident.
For example, the potential danger of repeated exposures to X-rays during radiological
examinations has been divined by the courts. See, e.g., Favalora v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 144 So. 2d 544 (La. Ct. App. 1962). The heretofore unquestioned widespread use
of X-ray therapy is also coming under increasing public scrutiny. See Radiological Time
Bomb, TIME, Sept. 23, 1974, at 99.
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United States. 8 While this book suffers in parts from sparse or hur-
ried legal analysis and may inspire reservations about its overall ob-
jectivity, it nevertheless does constitute a meaningful contribution to
a more nationally-targeted law of medical malpractice. Moreover, Mr.
Harney's book is one of the most readable and extensive statements
of the substantive law to date by a practicing attorney.
Handling Malpractice Cases-Practical Guidance
Chapter 10 (consisting of fifty-three pages) is devoted to the
handling of a malpractice case for the plaintiff. About half of that
space is consumed by sample procedural forms and a section which
the author dubs "Examples of Strong Cases." The latter consists of a
sampling of the gravamen (in a sentence or two) of forty or fifty mal-
practice cases. What remains is a scant thirty-odd pages to guide the
lawyer in the management and trial of malpractice cases.
It almost seems that Mr. Harney ran short of time as he reached
this last chapter. Some of the material pays short shrift to critical mat-
ters affecting litigation strategy and procedure. For instance, on the
crucial question of "whom to sue," Mr. Harney simplistically suggests
joinder of all individuals or entities which have contributed to the
injury, but not of an individual if he is innocent of wrongdoing.80 This
perfunctory advice offers little meaningful succor to the untutored
plaintiffs' attorney. It assumes a degree of omniscience on his part
in the early stages of the case regarding the nature of the involvement
of various potential defendants in the injury-producing transactions that
is rarely borne out in reality. It also manifestly ignores crucial tactical
considerations that may influence one's attitude toward joinder. These
include the hastening effect that statutes of limitations, which are typi-
cally short in malpractice actions, have on the joinder decision; the
fact that the testimony of named defendants will be regarded as "in-
terested" and thus perhaps will be accorded less weight by the jury; and
the fact that joinder may eliminate the possible argument that the real
culprit (by his own admission after any action against him personally
has become time-barred) is a non-party.40
There are also statements in the text which occasionally raise
questions as to the quality of the synthesis between the law and practice
38. See Summary of Recommendations, in U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, Enuc. & WE.-
FARE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 1, at xx.
39. See HARNEY § 10.11, at 369.
40. See C. KRAMER, supra note 9, at 39; M. LEVINE, supra note 9, at 405-06, re-




sections of the book. In his discussion of the substantive law of res
ipsa loquitur, for example, Mr. Harney comments: "In the author's
opinion, nowhere is the doctrine needed more than in the malpractice
action. . . . The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur facilitates . . .proof
[that defendant's acts caused the injury]. ' 41 Yet, later, in his discourse
on jury instructions, he proclaims: "It has been the experience of the
author that plaintiffs who rely on the res ipsa loquitur instruction with-
out supporting proof have a dismal track record."42
Not all the practice materials are cursory and uncritical. Much
advice, such as that rendered in the form of the author's firsthand ex-
periences cross-examining his opponents' medical experts, is quite effec-
tive.4" While Mr. Harney's practice materials do not match those of the
outstanding Charfoos book,44 they do fulfill a useful role in presenting
to the inexperienced plaintiffs' attorney, in capsule form, a readable pro-
cedural anatomy of a medical malpractice case along with some useful
insights.
Medical Discussion
While a physician certainly has an advantage over a layman in deal-
ing with medical facts,4" Mr. Harney nevertheless displays a competent
grasp of medical information and technical matters and relates them
well to malpractice in the legal context. His example may confirm the
suspicion that in order to successfully try a malpractice case, counsel
must know as much about the relevant medical issues as the expert
witnesses do. Most of the medical materials will be informative and
reassuring to the attorney facing the abyss of a new malpractice file.
While most doctors will not discover anything new from the strictly
medical standpoint, the medical facts cast in a legal perspective will
aid the doctor in making the transference in his perception of the "medi-
cal act-legal liability" dualism. Moreover, Mr. Harney's conserva-
tive estimate of what a physician can do without incurring liability
should at least not mislead physicians though it might exacerbate the
defensive medicine syndrome for some.
41. HARNEY § 4.3(A), at 173.
42. Id. § 10.26, at 407.
43. Id. § 10.25.
44. L. CHARFoos, supra note 9. The Charfoos handbook is entertainingly written
and offers a treasure of practical insights to the practicing plaintiffs' attorney. More-
over, it should similarly appeal to defense counsel if for no other reason than to remove
some of the mystery from the subject of how plaintiff prepares his case. The book also
provides worthwhile reading for the medical malpractice scholar, for whom the book of-
fers a practical insight that cannot help but profitably stimulate the reader's subsequent
legal perceptions regarding malpractice.
45. See, e.g., B. FICARRA, supra note 11.
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Some of the most useful medical information appears in Chapter
3 ("Standard of Care"), which discusses the specific medical and legal
standards applicable to numerous medical procedures ranging from
anesthesia and emergency room techniques to urinary catheterization. 40
The author also reviews some of the better medical and pharmaceutical
texts.
The only major criticism of the medical discussion is a matter of
structure. In three separate locations (in addition to the standard of
care sections) the author gives brief summaries of typical malpractice
situations, calling them "Common Medical Hazards"; 47  "Examples
of Strong Cases"; 48 and, "40 Malpractice Examples. 40  The first of
these-the materials in Chapter 9 ("Common Medical Hazards")-
employs informative citations to cases and medical authorities and is the
most valuable of the three discussions of typical acts that may consti-
tute malpractice. The other two sections serve little useful purpose
apart from filler. Here again, more care in collating is indicated. As
a minimum, the divers catalogues of essentially the same material should
have been consolidated.
The Appendices
It appears that as Mr. Harney progressed from front to rear in his
book, the overall utility decreased concomitantly. This process cul-
minates, with the exception of Appendix F, in the six remaining ap-
pendices.
The "Selected Good Samaritan Statutes" of Appendix A is com-
prised of thirty-eight statutes. A truly selective choice of representa-
tive statutes with citation to other identical or essentially similar stat-
utes would have avoided senseless repetition.50 Moreover, a grouping
according to their characteristics would have afforded the reader a
better opportunity to evaluate the state of the law in terms of numbers
and identity of states adhering to a particular statutory configuration.
Appendices B and C are excerpted from a Senate Subcommittee
report on medical malpractice,5 which includes a letter52 by Mr. Har-
46. See HARNEY § 3.9.
47. Id. §§ 9.1-.8.
48. Id. § 10.5.
49. Id. app. C, at 456-72.
50. For instance, in the first three pages of the Appendix identical sections from the
Good Samaritan statutes of California, Delaware, and Kentucky are fully set forth. Mr.
Harney is not alone in his penchant for statutory filler, which is also found in the Good
Samaritan statutes quoted in 2 D. LoUisELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, 21.01.1-
21.34.
51. SENATE SUBCOMM. ON ExEcuTIVE REORGANIZATION, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., RE-
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ney to that Committee. These items are somewhat dated,3 and are not
meaningfully integrated into the book. They could safely have been
omitted or at least heroically pruned.
Appendices D and E are sample interrogatories prepared for use
by plaintiffs and defendants respectively. These are probably helpful
to the novice. It is not apparent (other than on the basis of length)
why some forms were consigned to the Appendices and others in-
cluded within the body of the book. Nor is it evident why Mr. Haney
chose to throw in a single form used by defendants in this apparently
plaintiff-oriented book, unless of course his object was to condition
plaintiffs for the usual pre-trial procedural onslaught from the opposi-
tion. Even so, a single set of interrogatories hardly achieves that end.
Appendix F is somewhat unique in books on malpractice. It
contains annotated samples of professional liability insurance policies
for physicians and dentists, as well as for hospitals. This makes
worthwhile reading for the lawyer who expects to be counseling medi-
cal personnel. This Appendix also contains citations to a number of
authorities that are of mutual interest to both plaintiffs and defend-
ants. 54  The subject of liability insurance has been one area sadly
neglected in treatises on medical malpractice. This omission is es-
pecially remarkable in view of the critical role that insurance plays in
the immediate loss shifting of the instant case as well as in the long term
policy considerations that affect the development of the substantive
law. Mr. Harney has taken a notable first step toward filling this
yawning need for an examination of the function of the insurance car-
rier in medical malpractice litigation.
Appendix G is a partial trial transcript and was included to illus-
trate the techniques used in a plaintiff's examination of a defend-
ant-physician as an adverse witness. The transcript affords entertain-
ing reading, especially for those with little courtroom experience. Yet
PORT TO COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE PATIENT
VERsus THE PHYsIcIAN, 1-13, 25-39 (Comm. Print 1969).
52. Id. at 25-39.
53. The Harney letter was written (July 12, 1969) nearly four years prior to the
preface of his book.
54. See, e.g., HARNEY app. F, at 502-03, discussing L'Orange v. Medical Protective
Co., 394 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1968) (holding that it would be against public policy and a
breach of contract for a carrier to cancel a dentist's malpractice coverage following his
testimony in a malpractice action involving another dentist covered by insurance issued
by the same company). One also finds informative citations bearing on the issue of
the existence of insurance coverage in particular circumstances. The importance of the
presence or absence of liability insurance to plaintiff's trial strategy as well as the pros-
pects of an amicable settlement cannot be gainsaid.
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on balance, the twenty-odd pages it consumes could, like most of the
space absorbed by the appendices, have been more beneficially allo-
cated to more detail and analysis in the substantive portions of the
book and to a significant expansion of the thirty or so pages on the
handling of a plaintiffs malpractice case.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Harney has produced a worthy first effort at creating a single
all purpose volume for the plaintiffs' practitioner. It combines sub-
stantive law, a sense of the practical realities of litigation, and useful
medical information. While there are current works which probably
surpass the Harney book on each count, his is one of the best of the
recent literature which attempts to cover all the facets. His composite
score, then, compares favorably with anything of similar scope that
is currently available. Haney's Medical Malpractice is a recom-
mended addition to the practitioner's library, is worthwhile reading
for members of the medical profession, and is a fairly useful starting
point and case-finding tool for the malpractice researcher.
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